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Religious counselors tend to neglect theorists who
onpose religion.

B. F. Skinner and Albert Ellis implicitly

and explicitly criticize religion in their published writings.
These criticisms are connected with their atheistic philosophies.

Thomism is a theistic philosophy endorsed by the

Catholic Church.

Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan have

integrated Thomism with contemporary thought.

Their works

serve as models for this research project--a counselor's
integration of Thomism with the philosophies of B. F. Skinner
and Albert Ellis.
A counselor can disconnect Skinnerian and Ellisian
criticisms of religion from their atheistic philosophies.
Viewing the same criticisms in the context of a theistic
theory, a counselor can gain insights on religion and related
topics--sin, guilt, belief in God, prayer, afterlife--as
they apply to counseling.

This writer hopes that this

project will be an example to other religious counselors
who attempt to integrate religion and counseling.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF LITERATURE
Many people have recognized the need for an integration
of religion with psychology.

Paul Hauck, a clergyman involved

in counseling, expresses this need when he says:
The time for a realignment between religion and
psychology is not far off, and the effort will
be made. Those who sidestep this movement will find
themselves lost in the unfamiliar theological
climate of tomorrow. (Hauck, 1972, p. 16)
In his book, Hauck (1972) tries to integrate the views of
therapist Albert Ellis into a theistic approach to
counseling.
Paul Tournier, a psychiatrist interested in religion,
gives a personal witness to the need for integrating
religion and psychology when he says:
On the one hand there was my interest in religion,
and on the other my bent toward technique, invention,
and biology and science generally. I was unwilling
to give up either of these two interests. (Tournier,
1963, p. 4)
Although the viewpoint is different, Tournier senses the
same need as Hauck --the need to integrate religion and
psychology.

Actually, there is an abundance of literature

on the relationship between religion and psychology.
Although he does not explicitly discuss religion, Herbert
Marcuse (1966) deals with a subject which has implications
1

2
for religion when he comments on Freud's Civilization and
Its Discontents (1929).

Marcuse speaks of surplus repres-

sion and says that the institutions of society sometimes
excessively suppress the instincts of man.
be considered one such institution.

Religion could

Marcuse also argues

that there is a repression which is not excessive.

The

concept of surplus repression is similar to the idea of
excessive control .;nich Skinner speaks about in his work
(Skinner, 1953).
Erick Fromm (1950) seeks to integrate psychoanalysis
and religion.

He singles out Judaism (1966) and Christi-

anity (1955) for special treatment.

Fromm's major contri-

bution to the integration of psychology and religion is his
interpretation of religious experience.

He brings to the

foreground unconscious factors which may be present in the
religious believer's interpretation of religion:

for

example, the rationalization of prejudices, the suppression
of desires, etc.
0. H. Mowrer (1964), a psychologist who is a religious
believer, strongly advocates integrating theology and
psychology.

He says:

"I cannot conceive a sound theology

which is not congruent with a sound psychology; and the
assumption that the two can be significantly divergent has
surely been one of the most disruptive cultural elements of
modern time" (Mowrer, 1964, p. 145).

One area common to

religion and Psychology which Mowrer explores is the idea
of guilt.

He argues that there is a real guilt in human
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nature that is not to be psychoanalyzed away but is to be
used in a therapeutic situation.
Paul Tournier (1962) also treats the theme of guilt.
He deals with guilt not as something real and helpful in
therapy but as a sickness which needs to be cured by grace.
He points out that in many unconscious ways we make one
another feel guilty.

He finds the answer to this situation

in the coming of grace.

Like Mowrer, he believes in the

need to integrate religion and psychology in the alleviation
of distress caused by guilt.
Rollo May and Abraham Maslow are two representatives of
humanistic psychology who sense the importance of the
relationship between religion and psychology.

May (1953)

argues that religion can be a healthy force in helping a
person organize the self.

He also expresses the religious

dimensions of love (1969) and uses religious myth (1972) to
help him in his discussion of the connection between power
and innocence.
Maslow (1968) helps one understand better the contemplative side of religious experience.

He talks about

the knowledge and love of "Being" for its own sake.
Maslow suggests that man reaches out for experiences which
transcend the self and everyday living (1971).

He reports

that many people speak of their peak experiences, those
moments when they feel they have all the meaning of life
together.

He argues that a genuine science of psychology
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cannot afford to ignore this phenomenon simply because it
cannot be measured.
Eugene Kennedy is a catholic priest and psychologist
who combines psychology and the experience of the Roman
Catholic Church.

He integrates the insights of many modern

psychologists in his thinking.

For example, in his latest

book, A Sense of Life, A Sense of Sin (1975), he discusses
the meaning of a healthy sense of sin.
All of the cited literature is a recognition of the
need to integrate religion and psychology.

Most religious

writers approach the integration by discussing psychological theories which are fairly compatible with religious
viewpoints.

Incorporating into religious beliefs the views

held by the humanistic psychologists (such as

Rollo May

and Abraham Maslow) is a less formidable task than trying
to integrate the views of B. F. Skinner and Albert Ellis,
both professed atheists, into religion.
Statement of the Problem
This writer is a religious counselor who has a
Thomistic background and who respects Skinner's psychological theory and Ellis' counseling theory.

Thomas

Aquinas is a theist. but B. F. Skinner and Albert Ellis
are atheists.

The problem in this study, then, is to

integrate Thomism with the philosophies of B. F. Skinner
and Albert Ellis.
Counselors who have integrated their religious
beliefs with psychological counseling theory have tended
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to neglect maior theories which seem incompatible with
religion.

A religious counselor who disregards a theory

because it appears to conflict with religion seems to be
shunning a problem instead of confronting it.

Skinner's

Behavior Modification Theory and Ellis' Rational Emotive
Therapy are two major theories which, even though they may
appear to be opposed to religion, should not be neglected
by religious counselors.
Rationale for this Study
An obvious reason religious counselors cannot evade
the study of Skinner and Ellis is the reputation the two
enjoy, Skinner in the field of education and Ellis in the
area of counseling.

Skinner is well known as a learning

theorist, particularly in the field of special education.
Ellis' reputation as a counseling theorist is growing.

He

is a Prolific writer and a popular speaker--at the 1976
national convention of the American Personnel and Guidance
Association, he attracted one of the largest audiences of
any of the speakers.

In addition, he and his co-workers

at the Institute for Advanced Study in Rational Psychotherapy hold counseling workshops throughout the nation.
Reputation alone, however, would seem to be neither the
only reason nor perhaps even a compelling one for studying
Skinner and Ellis.

A more important reason for selecting

these theorists is their firm belief in science and its
application to the solution of human problems.

Indeed,

when Skinner and Ellis criticize religion, they do so in
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the name of science.

If a religious counselor can integrate

the philosophies of Skinner and Ellis into a religious
framework, a counseling theory with a strong scientific
basis will be the result.
Both Skinner and Ellis are directive--they believe that
a counselor should actively intervene in a counselee's life.
The controlling role which they attribute to the counselor
is an added reason for studying the religious implications
of their theories.

A Skinnerian or Ellisian counselor,

for instance, who is unaware of these implications might
unconsciously generate in a client an anti-religious bias.
An open discussion of Skinnerian and Ellisian religious
philosophy will hopefully eliminate such a danger.
A final reason for studying Skinner and Ellis is to
provide a model for other religious counselors.

If a

Thomistic counselor succeeds in combining the insights of
Skinner and Ellis with his own religious beliefs, other
individuals may be stimulated to integrate the techniques
developed by Skinner and Ellis (and/or by other theorists)
with their own religious viewpoints.

Thus, other religious

counselors may find useful the efforts put forward in this
project.
Overview of the Project
An interpretation of the philosophies of B. F. Skinner
and Albert Ellis and of Thomism will be presented before
an integration of these views is attempted.

The interpre-

tation will emphasize the relationship between religion

7

and counseling.

Since these thinkers have different

interests and do not treat ex professo the relationship
between religion and counseling, only those aspects of their
theories which have a bearing on religion and counseling
will be utilized.

Criticism of the theories presented will

be reserved until the end of the project when an integration
of Thomism and the philosophies of Skinner and Ellis will
be made.
This author will give his own interpretation of Thomism
and of the beliefs held by Skinner and Ellis.

Skinner and

Ellis clearly express their convictions in their writings,
and these writings will provide the material used in making
the interpretation.

Since Thomas Aquinas wrote in the

middle ages, it is deemed necessary to interpret him in the
light of the contemporary world, rather than against his own
historical background.
Other authors, notably Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan,
have also given a fresh interpretation of Thomas Aquinas.
They--being representative of Thomism today--serve as helpful models for this project.

Their viewpoints will be con-

sidered in the discussion of Thomism and in the integration
of Thomism with Skinner and Ellis.
Definition of Terms
Certain words and phrases will be used throughout this
study.

For the convenience of the reader, an explanation of

them is offered in this section.
Religious Counselor describes a counselor who believes
in Cod, the efficacy of prayer, etc., even though such a
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counselor may or may not be a practicing member of a
Particular denomination.

This author, for example, is a

practicing Roman Catholic but a counselor without a
particular religious affiliation might still be considered
a religious counselor.
Integration refers to the effort to combine elements
from a variety of theories into one new and consistent
theory.
Reinforcement refers to any factor in a person's
environment which strengthens behavior.

Reinforcement is

positive when a pleasant event (words, gestures) follows
behavior and tends to strengthen that behavior: it is
negative when the avoidance of an aversive event strengthens
the avoidance behavior.
Behavior Modification Theory is the view that behavior
can be changed through the judicious use of reinforcers.
Rational Emotive Therapy is a counseling method based
on the theory that people's disturbances are caused by
irrational ideas.
Thomism is the effort to reconcile the philosophy of
Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century) with modern thought.
Philosophies is used to designate such general viewpoints
as theorists' beliefs in the freedom of man, the existence
of God, the finitude of the world, the immortality of the
soul, etc.
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Limitations of the Study
Techninues of counseling which have been developed by
theorists other than Albert Ellis and B. F. Skinner can be
useful to the religious counselor.

Since this study is

limited to the philosophies of Skinner and Ellis, those
philosophies provide the limits for the theory of counseling
which will result from this project.
Organization of the Study
A chapter each will be devoted to Skinner. Ellis, and
Thomism.

Each chapter will be divided into three sections:

one section concerns the theorist's view of religion; a
second section treats the thinker's picture of the counselee;
a third section describes the theorist's beliefs concerning
the role of the counselor.

At the end of each chapter,

there will be a sulaviarv of the significant ideas which flow
from the counseling viewpoint presented.
The final chapter will integrate the findings of the
other three chapters.

A critical analysis of the view-

points of Skinner, Ellis, and Thomism is reserved for this
chapter.

The results of this analysis will be synthesized

in a religious counselor's integration of Thomism with the
philosophies of B. F. Skinner and Albert Ellis.

CHAPTER II
RELIGION AND COUNSELING:

B. F. SKINNER

Finley Carpenter (1974) says that whatever Skinner's
personal beliefs are, his theory is not unfavorable to
religion.

The thoughtful reader of Skinner's major works

will probably tend to agree with Carpenter.

Understanding

the religious philosophy of Skinner presupposes understanding
him as a scientist as well as a philosopher.

The student

can obtain Skinner's view of science from his book Science
and Human Behavior (1953) and his view of philosophy from
About Behaviorism, which Skinner wrote in 1974.
As a scientist, Skinner contrasts his view of behavior
with Pavlov's.

According to Pavlov, a reinforcer is paired

with a stimulus which elicits a behavior; whereas in Skinner's
view, a reinforcer is contingent upon a response--a specific
behavior (Skinner, 1953).

For example, according to Pavlov

the thought of heaven would stimulate a religious devotee
to behave well; but according to Skinner, the promise of
heaven would strengthen the good behavior already shown by
a religious devotee.

To distinguish his view of behavior

from Pavlov's, Skinner uses the term "operant conditioning."
Viewing religion scientifically, Skinner sees it as an
institution which provides reinforcers for a person's
behavior.
10
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Skinner views religion less favorably as a philosopher
than he does as a scientist.

In presenting his view of

philosophy, he concludes a description of the history of
religion with the observation.

"How much more we should

know if the prevailing contingencies had been described
rather than the feelings and isms generated by them!"
(Skinner, 1974, p. 147).

It would seem that, according to

Skinner, religion is important not by reason of the feelings
or philosophies of life it generates but by reason of the
fact that it reinforces behavior.
Religion as a Controlling Agency
Skinner prefers to approach religion as a scientist
working in a behavioristic framework.

As a scientist, he

discusses religion as one of many controlling agencies.
The religious agency may be a single agency, such as a
medicine man, or a well-organized group, such as a church:
but Skinner, in either case, is interested in the techniques
which the agency uses to control its devotees (Skinner, 1953).
His explanation of these controlling techniques should be
useful to counselors.
Skinner's view is that religion controls its membership
the way any group or government does.

Behavior is classified

as "legal" or "illegal," "moral" or "immoral," "virtuous" or
"sinful."

Religion reinforces appropriate behavior with

whatever means are available to its leaders.
are both positive and negative.

The reinforcers
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Positive reinforcers are often verbal:
the words "heaven" and "eternal life."

for example,

Religious education,

however, associates the verbal reinforcers with non-verbal
features of a person's environment.
non-verbal

Skinner says that the

features vary from culture to culture but it is

doubtful whether anywell-known reinforcer has not been used
(Skinner, 1953).

For example, "heaven" is compared to a

happy hunting ground, a perpetual banquet, or any other
environment which is especially attractive to a particular
class of people.
Skinner says that negative reinforcers are the most
powerful controls religion exercises and he believes that
it is unfortunate that they are used so often (Skinner, 1974).
For example, since hell is the absence of heaven and those
who sin go to hell, religious agencies generate a "sense of
sin."

One can escape sin only through expiation or absolu-

tion.

Being in the aversive condition known as sin, the

believer is like a hungry person without food.

Returning to

virtuous behavior, the believer is promised the banquet of
heaven.

Hell is a powerful negative reinforcer because, by

behaving well, a person hopes to avoid the aversive condition
of hell.

Since the believer behaves virtuously to avoid

hell, hell strengthens or reinforces virtuous behavior.
Religion may gain control of other variables in a
person's life.

For example, economics are used to control

the behavior of religious adherents.

Schools are set up to
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impart a religious outlook on life.

Religious leaders have

been very intent upon the use of government control--to
impose censorship, to eliminate the sale of alcoholic beverages,
or in various ways to remove temptations to sin from people's
lives.
Having discussed the way religion uses reinforcers
and tries to manipulate variables in a person's environment,
Skinner points out that religious agencies use another way
to control their communicants.

He says that they often con-

trol people not by manipulating contingencies of reinforcement in the environment but by using techniques of control
similar to those of counselors and teachers (Skinner, 1953).
These techniques will be mentioned in the section on
counselors.
Skinner's purpose in describing religion's techniques
of control is not to condemn religion but to help one understand how religion controls its communicant.

"It is not the

technique of control but the ultimate effect upon the group
which leads us to approve or disapprove of any practice"
(Skinner, 1953, p. 350).

This statement supports the

belief that Skinner's view is not unfavorable to religion;
Skinner does believe, however, that the counselee who is a
member of a religious group is often affected adversely by
the techniques of control exercised by that group.
The Counselee and Religion
The counselee's freedom is an important issue both in
counseling practice and in understanding Skinner's religious
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philosophy.

Freedom is important in the counseling

situation because the counselor tries to encourage a client
to make his or her own decisions.

Freedom is important to

a theologian because without freedom one cannot be held
responsible for one's own behavior.

Skinner (1974) recognizes

that the traditional emphasis placed on individual freedom
is at variance with his beliefs.
When Skinner wrote Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), he
anticipated resistance to his views on freedom:

"These are

sweeping changes, and those who are committed to traditional
theories and practices naturally resist them" (p. 19).
Relevant to the counselee, Skinner says:

"The critical con-

dition for the apparent exercise of free will is positive
reinforcement, as the result of which a person feels free and
calls himself free and says he does as he likes or what he
wants or is pleased to do" (1974, p. 54).

Skinner even

singles out a specific positive reinforcer which encourages
an attitude of freedom:

"What we may call the 'literature of

freedom' has been designed to induce people to escape from
or attack those who act to control them aversively" (1971,
p. 27).

Skinner's theory, therefore, would seem to justify

a counselor's treating the counselee as though he or she
were free.
A feeling of complete freedom is not deemed necessary
by Skinner, however.

Relevant to religion, he says:

certain amount of external control can be tolerated.

"A
Theo-

logians have accepted the fact that man must be predestined
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to do what an omniscient God knows he will do, and the Greek
dramatist took inexorable fate as his favorite theme" (1971,
p. 17).

With this statement, Skinner opens up the old

religious dilemma, predestination versus free-will.

He

also suggests that his scientific determinism is a secular
version of religious predestination.

According to Skinner,

then, the counselee can tolerate a certain amount of control
by religion.
Whatever the solution to the theoretical dilemmas,
Skinner's religious philosophy justifies the counselor's
seeing the counselee as a free agent and letting the counselee
set those goals he or she seeks to achieve.

His religious

philosophy also justifies the counselor's tolerating a certain amount of control by religion over the counselee.
Religion becomes aversive to the well-being of the
counselee when its control becomes excessive or inconsistent.
Superstition and magic are such forms of control.

Skinner

says that the terms superstition and magic are associated with
exploitation or selfish purposes or with ineffective or
poorly organized behavior (1953).

The effectiveness of the

counselee's behavior and appropriateness of the counselee's
goals for behavior would seem to form Skinner's criterion
for a tolerable level of control by religion.
In summary, Skinner's picture of the counselee and
religion is that the counselee appears to be free as long
as the cause of the behavior is unknown, and the counselee's
feeling of being free can be reinforced by the literature
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of freedom.

The counselee tolerates control by religion as

long as the control is not excessive or inconsistent.

One

implication of Skinner's reasoning is that religion can be
a reinforcer for behavior in accordance with the goals of the
counselee.

For example, the counselor might say, "What

you've done is the Christian thing to do!"
The Counselor and Religion
Skinner categorizes psychotherapy as a controlling
agency and lists the counselor as a person who practices
psychotherapy (1953).

He says that religious control is

often opposed by the control of the psychotherapist (1953).
By implication, a counselor is an independent agent in the
counselee's environment who sometimes, at least, has to
oppose religious control.
The key question for the counselor is when religious
control should be opposed.

Skinner says:

The control exercised by the group and by religious
and governmental agencies, as well as by parents,
employers, associates, and so on, restricts the
selfish, primarily reinforced behavior of the individual. It is exercised for just that reason.
Certain by-products, however, are not to the
advantage of the controller and are often harmful
both to the individual and to the group. (1953,
p. 359)
Skinner alerts the counselor to the "by-products" of
religious control--fear, anxiety, anger, and depression.
When these by-products are obvious to the counselor,
religious control should be opposed.
When the control of religion is believed to be harmful,
three techniques of countercontrol--escape, revolt, passive
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resistance--are available (Skinner. 1953).

The counselor,

after leading the client to an awareness of the harmful nature
of the control, can suggest these to the client under harmful religious control.
the methods.

Escape is probably the simplest of

The counselee can be encouraged simply to

escape the sphere of control of the religious agency.
Skinner (1953) says that the controllee can physically
escape or can simply "withdraw" without being physically
separated from the group.

He says that escape from religious

control can be accomplished by simple disbelief or defection.
Revolt, according to Skinner, is a counter-attack on
the controlling agency.

"Religious revolt may be directed

toward a specific agency, as in protestant reform, or against
the theological system used in control, as in atheism"
(Skinner, 1953, p. 360).

Skinner may be self-referential--

perhaps his own atheism reflects religious revolt, since he
does depict atheism as one technicue of revolt used to
countercontrol religion.
Passive resistance, according to Skinner, consists in
failing to behave in conformity with controlling practices.
He does not give an example of passive resistance to religious
control, but he does mention that religious agencies often
react to the passive resistance of followers by intensifying
their practices (Skinner, 1953).

For example, the passive

resister might get more freauent visits from the religious
group.
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The excessive or inconsistent controlling practices of
religion which lead a counselee to use techniques of countercontrol also give rise to emotional by-products--fear,
anxiety, anger, and depression (Skinner, 1953).

According

to Skinner, the variables which induce these patterns of
emotion belong to the environmental history of the individual.
An illustration of Skinner's meaning might be parental
concern about children's reading material.

Religious parents

disapprove reading material harmful to their children's
faith or morals.

This parental disapproval is a variable

in a child's environment--a variable, however, which can
induce in a child a fear not only of harmful books and
magazines but of worthwhile reading material as well.

In

the case of such a child, religious parents are indeed
achieving an appropriate goal--the elimination of harmful
books and magazines from their child's environment; however,
they are also inducing a harmful by-product, fear of reading.
When a counselee with such an environmental history comes
to a counselor, the counselor may be called upon to help
the client cope with the by-product.

For example, by

encouraging worthwhile reading the counselor can help the
client overcome the fear of reading.
Although areas of conflict often exist between the
counselor and religion, the counselor can develop a
philosophy which seeks to promote harmony between counseling
and religion.

Such a counselor would focus on those religious

technicues of control which reinforce the behavior the
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counselee desires to achieve.

Skinner does not go into

detail regarding the ways in which a counselor can promote
this harmony.
called for.

The ingenuity of the individual counselor is

The present project is an attempt to exercise

such ingenuity.
Summary and Conclusions
The counselor can find many helpful points by studying
Skinner's religious philosophy.

Religion, according to

Skinner, is one of those agencies which control the behavior
of the counselee.

Such control checks the counselee's

selfishness--selfishness which can he self-defeating as
well as harmful to various social groups.

In this instance,

Skinner's theory is favorable to religion.
When the control exercised by religion is excessive or
inconsistent, the counselor can serve as an agency of
countercontrol.

Skinner's idea of excessive control seems

to resemble Marcuse's idea of surplus repression.

Marcuse

(1966) argues that repression is not harmful to a person but
surplus repression is aversive.

Similarly, Skinner argues

that control is not harmful but excessive control is aversive
to an individual.

The counselor who intervenes when there

is excessive religious control would surely be serving not
only the best interests of the client but also the best
interests of religion itself.
Skinner's religious philosophy justifies a counselor's
behaving as though the counselee were free.

His problem with

freedom seems to be a secularized version of religious
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predestination versus free-will.

As a scientist, Skinner

seeks causes of human behavior, and the idea of freedom
seems to block this search for the determinants of behavior.
Nevertheless, his theory supports the counselor who reinforces the counselee's belief that he or she is free.
Skinner's auest is for human behavior to be controlled
in ways which bring optimal advantages to the individual and
to society.

This goal seems to be indistinguishable from

that of the counselee, the counselor, or religion.

A

counselee often feels out of control--that he or she is being
controlled by some outside agency.
may be religion.

One of these agencies

Skinner's religious philosophy helps a

counselor determine whether that control is beneficial to
the client or excessive and thus harmful.

Organized

religion can find a kindred spirit in Skinner in seeking
the improvement of man and can learn much from Skinner's
techniques of control.

CHAPTER III
RELIGION AND COUNSELING:

ALBERT ELLIS

Although Albert Ellis is a confirmed nonbeliever in
religion, he is not without respect for a religious believer
in his professional field.

He accepts those statements of

religious psychologists which help confirm his own scientific hypotheses.

Thus, he says about Magda Arnold:

And I continue to be pleasantly surprised when I
discover unusually close agreements between my own
views on personality and therapy and those if other
hard-thinking psychologists--such as Magda Arnold
(1960), many of whose positions are amazingly close
to my own, although she is a fine physiological
psychologist and fairly uncompromising Catholic,
while I am a clinician, a social psychologist, and
a confirmed nonbeliever. (Ellis, 1962, p. 36)
Obviously, Ellis accepts Magda's views as a psychologist
even though he and Magda differ widely on the question of
religion.

Ellis would seem to be inviting the religious

counselor to study his views for their psychological and
therapeutic value.
Ellis' philosophy seems to be a stoic rationalism in
modern dress.

In fact, Ellis singles out stoicism as a

major influence on his thinking (Ellis, 1962).

A comparison

of his list of irrational ideas with statements from the
Stoic Epictetus reveals a striking similarity between
Ellisian theory and stoicism (see Appendix).

According

to stoicism, what actually happens to people is not what
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upsets them, but what they tell themselves about what happens
is the upsetting factor, a key idea which Ellis borrows from
stoicism.

Actually, classical stoicism formed a philosophical

background for the New Testament (Interpreter's Bible, 1951).
The classical stoics believed in God and the immortality of
the soul,

Ellis, however, does not adopt these religious

beliefs but uses only those stoic beliefs which fit his
atheism and scientific rationalism (Ellis, 1962).
Ellis is probably even less favorable to religion than
Skinner.

He defines his rationalism as an opposition to

those elements usually found in religion.

He suggests that

the term "rationalism" denotes "opposition to all forms of
supernaturalism, spiritualism, mysticism..."
P. 124).

(Ellis, 1962,

Ellis calls himself a "modern" rationalist (Ellis,

1962), but the term "stoic rationalism in modern dress"
seems appropriate for his theory.
Orginally, Ellis called his counseling theory "rational
therapy" (RT).

After using this name for a year, he discovered

that TIlomists had been using it and he began to call his
theory "rational emotive psychotherapy" (RET), the name by
which Ellis' theory is known today (Ellis, 1962).

This

information seems to indicate that there is at least some
affinity between Thomism and Ellis' theory.
In discussing Ellis, the same organization is used
as in the chapter on Skinner--that is, a section each on
religion, the counselee, and the counselor.

Key points in

Ellis' theory of counseling are his views on religious guilt,
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the self-worth of the counselee, and the very activedirective role given to the counselor.
Religion
Since he uses science to criticize religion, Ellis'
understanding of science is important to a student of his
theory.

Ellis believes in science and lists four articles

in his creed.

First, he tell us:

"Reason and logic do

not contain or convey scientific evidence or truth in their
own right, but are most valuable tools for sifting truth
from falsehood" (Ellis, 1962, p. 123).

Second, he believes

that scientific knowledge must be confirmable, at least in
principle, by some form of human experience.

He goes on to

say, however, that "...theorizing that is limited only to
generalizations inducted from empirical evidence is often
not the best form of theory making; and the hypothetical deductive method...may be more productive for advancing
scientific research..." (Ellis, 1962, p. 123).

Third, he

believes in rationalism and is opposed to supernaturalism
and any form of authoritarianism.

Fourth, he believes that

man can improve his living by improving his thinking, although
he acknowledges that man does not live by reason alone
(Ellis, 1962).
How Ellis applies his understanding of science to a
criticism of religion can be seen by applying the four
articles in his creed to four religious concepts--the
authority of God, the concept of guilt, the reality of the
supernatural, and the moral improvement of man.

First,
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Ellis uses reason to reject the authority of God.

He says

that the concepts "God" and "Godlessness" do not have any
empirical evidence and he believes that such concepts give
rise to authoritarianism in religion (Ellis, 1962).

Ellis

believes in reason as the tool for distinguishing truth
from falsehood and does not believe in the authority of a
God who reveals truth.
Second, on the question of guilt, Ellis takes a
position which opposes that of Mowrer, who believes that
the client's guilt should be used in the counseling situation.

Ellis seems to be applying the second article in

his scientific creed when he says:

My

pronounced differences with all those who would
advocate making patients more guilty than they are,
in order presumably to get them to change their antisocial and self-defeating conduct, can perhaps be
demonstrated by my insistence on a more precise and
reasonably operational definition of the terms "sin"
and "guilt" than is usually given by those who uphold
this concept. (Ellis, 1962, P. 133)
An illustration of what Ellis seems to mean is the defining
of "sin" as an "offense against God."

This definition does

not seem to be confirmable by human experience--i.e.. it is not
operational.

Furthermore, such a definition would, accord-

ing to Ellis, tend to lead one to classify a "sinner" as
such by definition.

An operational definition, to the con-

trary, would apply to the behavior rather than the person.
Third, Ellis by reason of his rationalism divorces
human morality from any form of supernaturalism.

He views

sin as a problem which is solved by teaching new behaviors.
He explains his solution to moral problems as follows:
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The problem of all human morality, it must never be
forgotten, is not the problem of appeasing some
hypothetical deity or punishing the individual for
his supposed sins. It is the very simple problem,
which a concept of sin and atonement invariably
obfuscates, of teaching a person (a) not to commit
an antisocial act in the first place. and (b) if he
does happen to commit it, not to repeat it in the
second, third, and ultimate place. (Ellis. 1962, p. 135)
Instead of appealing to God to improve morality, Ellis
suggests that the way to teach a person not to commit an
antisocial act is to change the internalized conclusion:
If I do this wrong act, I will be a sinner, a blackguard,"
to this internalized conclusion:
will be wrong."

"If I do this act it

Any conclusion concerning the nature of

self is irrational, according to Ellis, who wants to eliminate the concept "sense of sin" (Ellis, 1962, p. 137).
Fourth, Ellis believes that man can improve morally
without such concepts as heaven and hell but by living
more spontaneously and rationally.

He says:

"Instead of

having either of these sets of self-values (heaven or
hell) it might be better if men and women would spontaneously, unmoralistically, and unself-consciouslv be"
(Ellis, 1962, p. 158).

Ellis objects to the concept of

hell because he believes that it leads a person to the
feeling of worthlessness.

He objects to the concept of

heaven because he believes that it leads one to behave
well in order to get there rather than facilitating
growth toward being a worthwhile person.
In summary, Ellis' belief in science leads him to challenge religion.

He criticizes religion for authoritarianism,
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its use of a concept of sin which leads to a low selfconcept, the vagueness of its supernaturalism, and its
failure in promoting the betterment of man.

Ellis'

criticisms challenge a religious counselor to develop a
counseling theory which overcomes them.
The Counselee
Ellis' view of the counselee and the central theme of
his theory are the same.

He says:

The central theme of RT is that man is a uniquely
rational, as well as a uniquely irrational, animal;
that his emotional or psychological disturbances
are largely a result of his thinking illogically or
irrationally; and that he can rid himself of most of
his emotional or mental unhappiness, ineffectuality,
and disturbance if he learns to maximize his rational
and minimize his irrational thinking. (Ellis, 1962,
p. 36)
Ellis believes that man's disturbances are largely due to
poor thinking and that rational thinking can relieve these
disturbances.

(Some disturbances, however, may have physical

causes, in which case rational thinking would not be a cure.)
Ellis gives a simple "A,B,C" view of the counselee in
Psychology Today (July, 1973).
event.

"A" stands for the activating

"C" stands for the emotional consequence.

Ellis

says that usually a person believes that C follows A.
Actually, however, C follows "B"--one's belief about an
event.

Ellis suggests that the upsetting factors are not the

events but a person's beliefs about these events.

For

example, if one person spills water on another, the event
of spilled water does not upset the dampened person.
emotional reaction is caused by the fact that the wet

The
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individual tells himself or herself that it was done on
purpose.

By controlling thinking and self-talk, a person

can minimize emotional upsets.
In order to control thinking and self-talk, an
individual has to choose to do so.
imolies free-will.

The ability to choose

On the issue of free-will versus determi-

nism, Ellis says that he takes a flexible, somewhat middle
of the road position.

Like Skinner, he acknowledges that

human events and the workings of the universe are largely
controlled by causal factors beyond an individual's will
or efforts.

Against Skinner, however, he takes the stand

that "the human being is a unicue kind of animal who has
the possibility, if he exerts considerable time and effort
in the present, of changing nnd controlling his future
behavior" (Ellis, 1962, p. 125).

The counselee has a

degree of freedom and has the responsibility to exercise
that freedom.

On this issue, Ellis agrees only partially

with Skinner.
Being free, the counselee decides which behaviors to
change.

Ellis (1962) points out that not all emotions are to

be changed.

Those emotions which are almost always unnecessary

to human living--depression, anxiety, anger, and hostility-are the ones Ellis is interested in erasing.

People have

healthy emotions but Ellis is seeking to cure people of
their neurotic emotions.
Ellis says that "neurosis essentially seems to consist
of stupid behavior by a non-stupid person" (Ellis, 1962, p. 54).

28

Ellis assumes that the counselee is an intelligent person
who seeks counseling to be cured of stupid behavior.

Since

the cause of the stupid behavior is irrational ideas, if the
counselor exposes and refutes these ideas, the counselee will
be cured.
The Counselor
Describing the role of the counselor, Ellis suggests
that the rational-emotive therapist attacks "the disturbed
person's illogical positions" by serving as " a frank
counter-propagandist" who contradicts and denies "the selfdefeating propaganda and superstitions which the patient has
orginally learned and which he is now self-instilling" (Ellis
1962, p. 95).

Encouraging, persuading, cajoling the client,

the rational-emotive therapist sometimes even insists that
the counselee engage in some activity "which itself will
serve as a forceful counter-propaganda agency against the
nonsense he believes" (Ellis, 1962, p. 95).

"Counter-

propagandist" seems to be the word which appropriately
describes the role of the counselor for Ellis.
Being a counter-propagandist, the counselor supplies
step D in the counseling process.
belief.

"D" stands for disputing

As mentioned previously, the client has taken steps

A, B, and C and has been made aware that it is B (belief
about the event) and not A (the event itself) which causes
emotional unset.

The counselor supplies step D by contra-

dicting, denying, and disputing the counselee's beliefs.
"E" stands for the new emotional effect in the life of the
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client.

Once the counselee has changed his or her self-

defeating beliefs, a new and healthy emotional effect takes
place.
Ellis raises and answers some objections which he says
are frequently raised against his view of the role of the
counselor.

One objection, according to Ellis, is that the

counselor who uses RET becomes too authoritarian (a criticism
of religion by Ellis, the reader may recall).

Ellis admits

that RET is directive and that there is a danger of the
counselor's being authoritarian in a pernicious way.

This

problem, according to Ellis, is handled by the counselor
revealing to the counselee the counselor's own value system.
Ellis says that every counselor has values and will do well
to be open about this fact rather than trying to hide it
(Ellis, 1962).
Another objection Ellis says is raised against RET
is that the counselee becomes too dependent on the counselor.
Ellis says that the counselor "can keep reminding himself
that the main goal of therapy is to help the patient stand
on his own two feet and to become independent of the
therapist as well as others" (Ellis, 1962, p. 367).

Ellis

seems to be making an important point in this statement.

A

religious counselor might reflect that religion may sometimes
be a crutch for a client, in which instance it would be one
of those "others" Ellis is talking about.

Surely, the

religious counselor, like Ellis, would want the client to
stand on his or her own feet.
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Conclusion
Although Albert Ellis is a confirmed nonbeliever in
religion, his philosophy has much to offer the religious
counselor:

he emphasizes the importance of reason in

counseling; he challenges the religious counselor to have
a precise concept and operational definition of sin and
guilt; he forces the religious counselor to confront the
problem: of life here and now rather than escape into a
vague supernatural realm; he upholds belief in the selfworth of the counselee.

Of all the points which Ellis

makes, this last one--the self-worth of the counselee-seems to be most important for a religious counselor.

The

religious counselor is actually challenged by Ellis to
believe in and practice the distinction between sin and
the sinner.
Science seems to be Ellis' religion.

Yet, as a

scientist, he believes in freedom as well as in determinism.
Freedom, for Ellis, is not an easy matter but requires time
and effort.

Unlike Skinner, Ellis would argue that freedom

is more than a cover for our lack of knowledge of the
causes of human behavior.

Ellis believes that individuals

really are free to change their own behavior.
Ellis believes that counselors should not hide their
own value systems.

His belief is a support to the religious

counselor whose values are strengthened by the religion he
or she believes in.

Surely, the religious counselor would

agree with Ellis that one's values are present in the
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counseling situation--either openly or in a hidden way—and
that it is better to admit them to a client.
According to Ellis, the counselor is active and directive.
Ellis seems to believe that one can be active and directive
without Yielding to authoritarianism.

This would seem to be

good news to a religious counselor because a religious
counselor seeks guidance from religion and does not seem to
want to fall into the trap of authoritarianism.
Finally, Ellis gives a handy definition of neurosis-stupid behavior in non-stupid people.

The religious counselor

can find in this definition a wholesome view of the client.
Like Ellis, the religious counselor can view the counselee
as a worthwhile person.

Like Ellis, the religious counselor

can attack those irrational ideas which cause stupid
behavior.

Studying Ellis' criticisms of religion, the

religious counselor can even go beyond Ellis and draw on
religion to help promote intelligent behavior in a worthwhile
person.

CHAPTER IV
RELIGION AND COUNSELING:

THOMISM

A counselor in the twentieth century who wishes to
integrate Thomism with contemporary thinkers must first
interpret Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century).
two main ways of interpreting Aquinas.

There are

One way, using the

historical-critical method, is to interpret him against the
background of his time in terms of the auestions he raised
and answered.

A second way is to read his works in terms

of the questions raised today.

Although the first is not

being ignored, the second way is the main route taken for
this project.
Thomas Aauinas presented a synthesis of his views of
religion, psychology, and what is now called "counseling" in
a work called the Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology),
which he wrote for novices in a religious order.

This work

Part One deals with the pro-

is divided into three parts:

cession of creatures from God; Part Two deals with man,
man's quest for happiness, man's virtues and vices, and
man's states of life--for example, celibate, married, or
members of a religious order; Part Three deals with man's
return to God through Christ.
The structure of the Summa Theologiaa (abbreviated as
ST) is carefully organized.

Part Two, which serves as the
32
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basis for this chapter, is divided into two parts.

These

are customarily referred to as part one of the second part
(abbreviated as 1-2) and part two of the second part (abbreviated as 2-2).

Each of these parts is subdivided into questions

(abbreviated as q. 1, 2, 3, etc.).

Each question is further

divided into articles (Abbreviated as a. 1, 2, 3, etc.).

For

example, the section on counseling would be referenced "ST,
1-2, q. 14" which means the Summa Theologica, part one of the
second part, question 14.
In addition to Thomas Aquinas there are two leading
thinkers in the field of Catholic theology, Bernard Lonergan
and Karl Rahner, whose writings are valuable in understanding
Thomism in terms of contemporary thinking.

Although both

theologians have moved beyond an older approach to Thomas
Aquinas, their background is Thomistic and Aquinas still
influences them to the degree that justifies the applying to
them the rubric of "Thomism."

They, in their efforts to

integrate Thomas Aauinas with modern thought, also provide
models for this project.
Thomistic Counseling
Before a Thomistic view of religion, the counselee, and
the counselor is presented, the counseling process according
to Aquinas should be described.

In the first part of Part Two

of the Surma, Aquinas tells us that a person seeks counseling
about those things he or she wishes to do.

According to

Thomas, there is much uncertainty about what to do because
actions deal with individual matters which are variable as
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opposed to universal principles which are unchangeable.

A

person, then, comes for counseling when he or she is undecided about the means which seem best for achieving a goal
(ST 1-2, q. 14, a. 1).
Counseling precedes the choosing of a means to an end.
According to Aquinas, the counselee chooses the end or goal
and the counselor helps the counselee discover the means
which seem most effective in reaching the chosen goal.
Aquinas says that counseling pertains to both the human will
and human reason:

the counselee supplies the subject matter

in counseling by presenting what he or she wishes to do
(human will), the counselor suggests to the counselee plans
for achieving the counselee's goals (human reason).
Aquinas says that the subject matter of counseling is
limited by the field itself, by the importance of the problem,
and by man's possibilities.

The field of counseling is not

concerned with the best way of proceding in other disciplines:
a writer, for instance, does not learn the rules of grammar
from a counselor.

Counseling does not deal wfrh every petty

detail in a counselee's life:

when a counselee seeks

counseling, the problem is important (at least to the
counselee).

Finally, counseling concerns that which is

within our immediate power to accomplish:

for example, one

does not seek advice today on how best to fly to Jupiter.
The counseling process is, then, a community endeavor
between the counselee and counselor, according to Aquinas.
He says that the term "counsel" is closely related to
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"considium" which means "sitting together."

The counselee

and counselor sit together to confer at the same time about
a problem (ST

1-2, q. 14).

The counselee comes to the pro-

cess with a desire to achieve a goal.

The counselor is

trained in the skills of providing alternative means to
achieve goals.

These means are limited by that which is in

our immediate power to use.
Religion
Religion, according to Aquinas, is a moral virtue
whereby a person worships God by such means as sacrifices,
offerings, and prayers (ST

q.

81, a. 5).

A religious

person recognizes the rights of God and recognizes as well
the rights of the state, individual human beings, nature.
etc.

As a moral virtue, religion is related to justice.

Religion is not identical with justice since one cannot
repay God what is His due.

Religion, however, is an attempt

to repay God (like piety towards one's parents is an attempt
to repay one's parents) and, therefore, is associated with
justice.
Aquinas says that moral virtue strikes a balance
between extremes.

Since religion is a moral virtue, one

can have too much religion or too little religion.

According

to Aquinas, superstition is extremism in religion; he states
that extremism in religion is determined by the circumstances
of person, place, means, motive, manner, and time (ST 1-2,
q. 7, a. 3).

An example might be the religious magician,

such as a rainmaker or faith healer, who uses religion to
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make money.

The person, means, and motive may make such

practice superstitious.

Another example might be the house-

wife who goes to church to the extent of neglecting her
family:

the place, time, and the manner might make her

practice superstitious.
Thomism seeks to promote religion and eliminate superstition.

According to the Thomist, a person cannot believe

in, hope in, or love God too much but a person can, indeed,
be excessive in the practice of religion.

One can also be

remiss in the practice of religion, according to Thomism; the
reason for stressing excessive practice is that it can he
easily overlooked.

In short, the virtue of religion lies

in a balance in the practice of religion.
The Counselee
Aquinas pictures the counselee as a person created in
the image of God.

As an image, a person reflects the God-

like qualities of intelligence and free-will--the power to
act on one's own (ST 1-2, Prologue).

Being endowed with

these qualities, a person is able to pursue a good life
which is ultimately a God-like life.

Hence, in the view of

Aquinas, the counselee is endowed with a dignity and a value
even beyond a merely human value.

The counselee's destiny

is to share in God's own life.
A good life is defined by Aquinas in terms of seven
virtues:

faith, hope, charity, prudence, justice, courage,

and temperance (ST 2-2, Prologue).

Faith, hope, and charity

are technically known as theological virtues--having God for
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their object.

Since they presuppose a belief in God, they

are less relevant to this discussion, which includes those
who do not believe in God.

Prudence, justice, courage, and

temperance are technically known as moral virtues--having the
betterment of man for their object.

Presumably all men,

whether believing in God or not, are interested in the
betterment of man.

Hence, the moral virtues are more relevant

to this discussion.
In interpreting Aquinas today, this writer would like
to speak less objectively than Aquinas about the virtues.
Prudence, justice, courage, and temperance are not objective
characteristics that one either has or does not have.

Speak-

ing more in terms of the individual subject, one can say
that a person lives well by living prudently, justly,
courageously, and temperately.

This description presents

a dynamic picture of the counselee.
This picture of the counselee does not contain any
"shoulds."

Rather, it contains reasons for the counselee's

coming to a counselor.

The counselee frequently wants to

learn the prudent or fair thing to do.

He or she is con-

cerned about courageously conquering fear, anxiety, or
depression and about temperately moderating desire or anger.
The Counselor
Bernard Lonergan (1972) suggests four precepts for any
method which a counselor may use in a counseling situation.
They are:

1) sensitivity to experience, 2) intelligence in

understanding, 3) reasonableness in criticizing, and
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4) responsibility in deciding.

Applied to a counselor, these

points mean that a counselor needs to be sensitive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

Most counselors would

agree that counseling should reflect Lonergan's four points.
Lonergan's four points constitute what he labels
"transcendental method"--transcendental in the sense of
being presupposed by any particular method, such as

a

particular counseling method--cognitive, behavioral, directive
etc.

Although Lonergan's precepts seem obvious, he points

out that they are difficult to apply when he says:
Now in a sense everyone knows and observes transcendental method. Everyone does so, precisely in
the measure that he is attentive, intelligent,
reasonable, responsible. But in another sense it is
quite difficult to be at home in transcendental
method, for that is not to he achieved by reading
books or listening to lectures or analyzing language.
It is a matter of heightening one's consciousness
by objectifying it, and that is something that
each one, ultimately, has to do in himself and for
himself. (Lonergan, 1972, p. 14)
Thomism is open-ended for the prospective counselor, that
is, it offers no rules whereby one can become a good
counselor.

Each person has to develop a style of counseling

suited to himself or herself.

Developing into a good

counselor is not simply a matter of reading books or
listening to lectures.
The counselor can usually help a client, however, by
using for a model the kind of behavior Lonergan refers to-by being sensitive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.
The counselor can also point to those models in a client's
environment who portray these features.

Sometimes, it is
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helpful to encourage the client to study a person, or the
biography of a person, who has the desired features.
Although the Thomistic counselor is directive and has
specific goals for healthy human behavior, such a counselor
recognizes the freedom of clients to choose their own goals.
A Thomist can only suggest to another person that behaving
prudently, fairly, courageously, and temperately is beneficial.

The Thomist can also point out means of achieving

this behavior, but the client must make the decision to
follow (or not to follow) the suggestion.
Conclusion
Thomism is an open-ended philosophy of counseling.
Thomist distinguishes religion from superstition:

A

on the

one hand, a person behaves religiously by seeking to be
balanced in the practice of religion; on the other hand, a
person behaves superstitiously by acting excessively in the
practice of religion.

One task of a Thomist is to encourage

a balanced approach to religion.
The Thomist believes that the counselee is a free agent
in the counseling situation and has inner resources with
which to cope with problems.

The counselee is pictured as

one who is seeking to live well--to live prudently, justly,
courageously, and temperately.

Although this picture exists

in the counselor's mind, the Thomist would not attempt to
force these virtues on a client.
The Thomistic counselor seeks to be attentive and
sensitive to experience, intelligent in understanding,
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reasonable in criticizing, and responsible in deciding.
At first glance, these criteria may look easy, but the
difficulty lies in the fact that there is no magic formula
for developing these desired features.

Reading, attending

classes, listening to lectures, group experiences, and
studying models may all be helpful to the potential
counselor, but, in the final analysis, a counselor probably
achieves these elements through the integration of different
types of material and experience.

CHAPTER V
AN INTEGRATION OF THOMISM, SKINNER, AND ELLIS
Although Thomism is theistic and Skinner and Ellis are
atheistic, all three agree on the nature of counseling.

The

Thomist will agree with Skinner and Ellis that counseling is
directive--that the counselor is playing an active role in
the client's life by giving prescriptions which help the
client achieve goals.

Skinner arms the counselor with rein-

forcers, positive and negative.

Ellis urges the counselor

to attack irrational ideas held by the counselee.

Thomism

would have the counselor encourage the client to virtuous
living.
All three also agree that counseling is empirical.
Skinner, as a scientist, seeks a psychological theory which
can be verified by observation.

Ellis speaks of operational

definitions—definitions confirmable by human experience.
Thomas Aquinas says that counseling deals with variables
and not unchanging principles.

All three would encourage

empirical research which can be used to improve counseling.
Thomists can learn much from Skinner and Ellis about
the role of religion in counseling.

Their outlooks on

religion in human psychology contain helpful insights into
the ways in which religion affects the counseling situation.
A counselor's integration of these insights with Thomism
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Con-

provides the subject matter for this final chapter.

sistent with previous chapters, the subject is discussed
under the headings of religion, the counselee, and the
counselor.
Religion
Skinner views religion as an institution.

Like any

other institution, religion uses reinforcers to strengthen
good behavior in those who belong to it.

He observes that

religion has frequently found its most powerful reinforcers
to be negative; but, as a psychologist, he believes that it
is preferable for religion to use positive reinforcers.
Since the Thomistic counselor's goal is virtuous
behavior in a client. the Thomist would tend to agree with
Skinner that positive reinforcers are preferable to negative
reinforcers.

The counselor, for instance, who praises an

example of courageous behavior in a client would seem to be
more effectively promoting the virtue of courage than one
who is simply silent in the face of cowardly behavior.
C. D. Batson (1976) has researched religion as a prosocial force and has concluded that religion helps society
more when it is positive than when it is negative.

Such

research tends to support Skinnerian-Thomistic reasoning.
With an integrated view of Thomism and Skinner, then, a
counselor will seek from religion positive reinforcers-models of desirable behavior, for example—to encourage
a client in virtuous behavior.
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Ellis substitutes science for religion.

For this

reason, integrating his view with Thomism is difficult.
However, he gives an opening to a Thomist on the basis of
his belief in science.

Although Ellis rejects the concept

of "(;od" because it lacks empirical evidence, he has to
accept the experience which the religious devotee claims.
Ellis may believe that there is no foundation in reality for
such an experience, but the experience itself is a fact
which has been the focus of research efforts.

For example,

R. W. Hood (1975) has studied such mystical experience and
tried to measure it.

Since the client often brings religious

experience to the counseling situation, the counselor cannot simply dismiss or ignore it.
Like Ellis, the Thomist believes in the value of logic
and reason.

What the Thomist rejects is the ascription by

Ellis of an irrational and blind authoritarianism to all
religion.

The Thomist would distinguish between healthy

and unhealthy religion or between authentic religion and
superstition.

Ellis' description of religion would more

accurately fit superstition than authentic religion.
One concern of the Thomist who counsels with religiously-oriented individuals is the effect of religion on
the counselee and the use of religion to help a client.
The response to this concern depends on the situation of
the counselee and the counselor's view of the counselee.
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The Counselee
According to Skinner, the counselee may believe that
he or she is free, but such individual freedom is not supported scientifically.

In reality, says Skinner, the

counselee is controlled by various environments.

One such

environment, religion, sometimes aversively controls its
devotees by reinforcement which is excessive or inconsistent.
When religion uses excessive or inconsistent reinforcement,
the counselor should intervene by presenting alternative
reinforcers.

An illustration might be a counselor recom-

mending the literature of freedom to a client who feels
oppressed by a legalistic and moralistic interpretation of
the bible.

Instead of opposing the bible, the counselor

may wisely recommend other literature as an alternative
reinforcer.
A Thomist recognizes with Skinner that the counselee
is not completely free but disagrees with Skinner's belief
that the counselee is controlled totally by outside forces.
The Thomist believes that the client is able, to a greater
or lesser degree, to control his or her own behavior.
According to Thomism, a counselor will not only provide
reinforcers but will also encourage a decision on the part
of the client to modify his or her behavior.
Religion, when it is consistent and moderate, provides
reinforcers which encourage virtuous behavior.

Instances

of such reinforcement are the examples of virtuous behavior
in people like St. Francis Assisi, St. Clare, Siddhartha,
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Confucius, etc.; the praise of authentically religious
parents; and good sermons.

The Thomist can expect from the

client a free response to such reinforcers.
Ellis holds essentially the same position as a Thomist
on the counselee's freedom, hut he has another criticism
of religion and its influence on the client.

Ellis' main

concern is that the client have a healthy self-concept.

A

healthy self-concept, according to Ellis, is that a client
believe that he or she is a fallible human being--an essentially good person who is able to make mistakes and do
some things that are wrong but who remains, nevertheless,
a good person.
Religion, according to Ellis, negates a healthy selfconcept since it teaches the client that he or she is a
"sinner," that is, a blackguard or an evil person.

Ellis,

in the name of science, attacks the concept of "sin" by
arguing that one cannot give an operational definition of
sin in such a way that one can distinguish "sin" from the
"sinner.-

Ellis' criticism of the traditional concept of

sin seems to be one of his most challenging criticisms of
religion.
Traditionally, Thomists have believed that one should
distinguish between "sin" and the "sinner."

However,

Ellis' criticism of the terminology is well taken in that
condemnation of sin seems to transfer easily to the person
of the sinner, thereby diminishing the individual's selfconcept.

The theologian who believes in the self-worth of
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each individual is, then, challenged by Ellis to clarify the
concept of sin in such a way that it does not destroy a
person's self-concept.
Karl Rahner, a Catholic theologian, says of sin that:
...man is not only conmmnded not to "judge" others,
i.e. not to make absolute assertions about the real
state of a person deep down and in the sight of God,
but he also cannot and is not allowed to pass such
an absolute judgement on himself and declare himself
to be either absolutely justified or an absolute
sinner, in the sense of declaring that a justifying
or sinful act has certainly taken place here and
now. (Rahner, 1961, p. 275)
Sin, as a theological concept, refers to the relation which
exists between God and man.

God alone can judge whether sin

is present, and this judgement remains with God even though
man can receive signs of God's forgiveness.

Since man can-

not judge with certainty the presence of sin, according to
Rahner, neither self-righteousness nor self-depreciation are
warranted.

Judgement concerning sin is God's affair.

Since the concept of sin presupposes a belief in God,
it is not surprising that Ellis, a confirmed nonbeliever,
rejects it.

The Thomist can only respond to Ellis by saying

that a concept of sin need not imply low self-esteem on the
part of the client.

The Thomist could also add that if a

counselee has a low self-concept because of the feeling of
being a worthless sinner, such an individual may be misinterpreting the concept of sin.

Ellis prefers to talk about

wrongdoing, rather than sin, and offers an operational
definition of wrongdoing.

47
Wrongdoing, according to Ellis, is antisocial or selfdefeating behavior.

He distinguishes between such behavior

and the person performing it.

If a person says that he or

she has done something "wrong" and will do "right" the next
time, this person is talking rationally.

To the contrary, if

a person says that he or she has done something "wrong" and
is no good, this person is talking irrationally.

The indi-

vidual person is a fallible human being who sometimes does
something

believed to be wrong but who can anticipate chang-

ing his or her behavior the next time such circumstances occur.
The Thomist would agree with Ellis' viewpoint as far as
it goes but would be concerned not so much with acts of
wrongdoing as with habits of human behavior.

Incidentally,

what Ellis refers to as irrational thinking could be viewed
by a Thomist as a bad habit.

For example, one incidence of

stealing would not concern a Thomist as much as would a
habit of shoplifting.

The opposite habit would be respect-

ing property--the good habit or virtue of justice --and the
Thomist would be concerned about promoting this habit.
Guilt is an emotion which can be devastating to the
persons suffering from it.

The Thomist will take a middle

position between Ellis and Mowrer on guilt.

If the guilt is

irrational --having no basis in client behavior, attitude,
or intention--the Thomist will use Ellis' techniques to
eliminate the guilt.

However, if the guilt has some

foundation in reality the Thomist, like Mowrer, will
encourage the client to face that which is causing him or
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her to feel guilty.

Guilt, for a Thomist, is ambiguous and

the approach to it depends on the situation of the counselee.
The Thomist not only looks beyond the counselee's
specific acts to the habits of behavior but also looks to
the intentionality—the dispositions to act--of a client.
Resentments, hostility, self-pity, prejudice, etc. constitute
this intentionality.

Such tendencies can be sources of

guilt feelings almost to the same extent as wrongdoing
itself.

Since they represent obstacles to the development

of good habits, they are impediments to virtuous living on
the part of the counselee.
In sunultary, a counselor who integrates Thomism with the
religious philosophies of Skinner and Ellis views the client
as a person who is created in the image of God and is free
to yield to reasonable control by religion and to reject
excessive control by religion.

Such a counselor will encourage

a client to develop a healthy self-concept, to live virtuously, and to eliminate irrational guilt feelings.

Although

the client cannot be absolutely certain of justification
from God, the client will be encouraged to recognize the
signs of forgiveness in the religion of his or her persuasion.
The Counselor
The Thomistic counselor is not as directive as the
Skinnerian or the Ellisian.

The Thomist believes that God

is present in the counseling situation and is helping direct
the client.

The Skinnerian and Ellisian recognize only the

presence of the counselor and the counselee and recognize
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only the power of the counselor to direct and control the
counselee.

The Skinnerian controls the client with rein-

forcers, while the Ellisian acts as a propagandist for
rational thinking.

The Thomist, even when borrowing these

techniques from Skinner and Ellis, seeks the direction of

nod

and helps the client choose those means which seem best

for arriving at the goals set by the client.
As a model, the Thomist has the virtuous person--one
who lives prudently, justly, courageously, and temperately.
The Thomist hopes the client will make a free decision to
become this kind of person.

In seeking to help a client

live more rationally, an Ellisian emphasizes only one of the
qualities of a virtuous person--living prudently.

The

Thomist also believes in the importance of prudence-appling reason to the things to be done--but believes
furthermore in the importance of the other virtues in that
they integrate reason with the emotions.

An Ellisian leaves

the impression that emotions are pathological.

A Thomist

admits that such is sometimes the case but argues that the
emotions are generally healthy--especially in the virtuous
person who moderates fear by means of courage and desire by
means of temperance.
According to Thomism, the counselor should become a
virtuous model since the client often models the behavior
of the counselor.

Surely, Ellis himself provides an example

of rational thinking.

Also behind the counselor's being
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a model is the idea that the counselor's belief in the theory
should lead to its being exemplified in his or her own life.
Being a theist, the Thomistic counselor can not only
use the techniques of Skinner and Ellis but can also reach
beyond to God.
counseling.

Prayer can become an integral part of

The Thomistic counselor will pray for and some-

times with the client.

Although the Thomistic counselor

will not force his or her piety on the client, praying in
the counseling situation can be helpful if the client is a
religious believer.

Prayer sometimes helps a client to

become more open to the counselor, since God's presence will
be recognized as an active ingredient in the counseling
Si tuation.
The counselor who integrates Thomism with the theories
of Skinner and Ellis will exhibit the qualities of sensitivity, understanding, reasonable criticism and responsibility.

Since they constitute empathy, sensitivity and

understanding are two very important qualities in a counselor.
The importance of empathy in counseling is stressed by most
professionals in the field.

Rodney Goodyear discussed

empathy at the 1976 meeting of the American Personnel and
Guidance Association and called for further research in this
area.

The Thomist is in accord with this proposal.
Conclusions

A religious counselor can integrate Thomism and the
philosophies of Skinner and Ellis into one counseling theory.
Skinner and Ellis can provide insights into some of the most
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effective means of achieving goals.

Especially useful are

Skinner's reinforcement theory and Ellis' discovery of
irrational ideas which disturb behavior.

These insights

can be integrated with Thomism to provide a religious
counselor with a stronger counseling theory.
Such an integrated theory sees virtuous living-living rationally and being emotionally healthy—as a
dynamic model for counseling.

The model is dynamic

because what is virtuous to one generation or culture may
not be to another.

The model is also dynamic because each

counselor in his or her uniqueness can provide a virtuous
model.

Prom Skinner, one can learn the value of positive

reinforcers which encourage virtuous living.

In Ellis,

one can discover added support for the Thomistic belief
that prudence is the queen of the virtues.
Dialogue with atheists, such as Skinner and Ellis, who
are in the field of counseling can profit the theist.

A

theist who is willing to think through tFe atheistic
criticisms against religion discovers a valuable ally in
the promotion of authentic religion.

Furthermore, agree-

ment on the nature and techniques of counseling is significant in view of the fact that there is disagreement on so
fundamental a point as the existence of God.
A theist, however, finds the atheistic perspective
limited.

If Cod is real, Cod can be a powerful help in

the counseling situation.

A theist finds it difficult, if

not impossible, to convince an atheist that God is real.
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However, a theist can point out to the atheistic counselor
that many a client believes in the reality of God and, in such
instances, even if God is not real to the counselor, God is
In Skinner's language, God can be

real to the counselee.

labelled an independent variable in the counseling situation.
In Ellis' thought, God--over and above the counselor--can be
a propagandist for reason.
There is a basic agreement between Thomas, Skinner.
and Ellis that counseling is empirical.
empirical in two senses.

Counseling today is

In one sense, approaches to

counseling are verified by the counselor's experience with
various clients.

Tn another sense, researchable questions

open to the gathering of empirical evidence are raised.
A theistic counselor is using the empirical method in
the first sense when he or she concludes that God and
religion have helped the client to better behavior
(Skinner), more rational living (Ellis), and virtuous
living (Thomas Aquinas).
religion to advantage.

A theistic counselor can use

The theistic counselor can always

pray for the counselee and, when the counselee is willing,
can pray with the counselee.

Even an atheist can encourage

a counselee to pray if it corresponds to the counselee's
beliefs.

Also, any counselor can draw on the scriptures

of the world's religions as helpful reinforcers for a client.
A theistic counselor, using empirical method in the
second sense mentioned above, can suggest to an atheistic
counselor that researchable questions on the relevance of
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religious belief to counseling can be raised.

Cod is

invisible but effects attributed to God can be observed,
measured, and evaluated.
measured.

Mystical experience has been

The effects of various religious denominations

on people's attitudes can be observed and evaluated.

An

atheist can seek an hypothesis different from God to explain
these effects: but if an atheist ignores the relevance of
such phenomena to counseling, atheism becomes a severe
limitation.
Finally, the theistic counselor is aware of the
benefits of religious experience in his or her own life.
And without seeking to influence the religious belief of
clients, the theist can say at 1,forning Prayer:
There's not a plant or flower below,
But makes your glories known;
And clouds arise, and tempests blow,
By order from thy throne;
While all that borrows life from thee
Is ever in thy care,
And everywhere that man can be,
You, God, are present there. (Watts, 1715)
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Ellis' Irrational Ideas and Epictetus
The following is a list of Ellis' eleven irrational
ideas which frenuentiv cause emotional reactions in people
(Ellis, 1962).

A quotation from Epictetus follows each idea.

The nuotations are selected in opposition to the irrational
idea to show that stoic advice was given to minimize people's
irrational thinking, a similarity between Ellis' theory and
stoicism.
1.

The idea that it is a dire necessity for an adult human
being to be loved or approved by virtually every
significant other person in his community.
"Bear in mind that it is not the man who reviles or
strikes you that insults You, but it is Your judgment
that these men are insulting You. Therefore, when someone irritates You, be assured that it is Your own opinion
which has irritated You" (Johnson, 1974, p. 90).

2.

The idea that one would he thoroughly competent,
adequate and achieving in all possible respects if one
is to consider oneself worthwhile.
"The following statements constitute a non seauitur:
'I am richer than You are, therefore I am superior to
you.' But the following conclusions are better: 'I am
richer than You are, therefore my property is superior
to yours': or, 'I am more eloquent than You are, therefore mv elocution is superior to yours.' But you are
neither property nor elocution" (Johnson, 1974, p. 98).

3.

The idea that certain people are bad, wicked, or
villainous and that they should be severely blamed and
punished for their villainy.
"Signs of one who is making progress are: He
censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, finds
fault with no one" (Johnson, 1974, p. 99).

4.

The idea that it is awful and catastrophic when things
are not the way one would very much like them to be.
"Do not seek to have everything to happen as it
actually does happen, and Your life will be serene"
(Johnson, 1974, n. 88).

5.

The idea that human happiness is externally caused and
that people have little or no ability to control their
sorrows and disturbances.
"It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but
their ;udgments about these things. For example, death
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is nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have
thought so, but the judgment that death is dreadful,
this is the dreadful thing" (Johnson, 1974, p. 88).
6.

The idea that if something is or may be dangerous or fearsome one should be terribly concerned about it and should
keep dwelling on the possibility of its occurring.
"If you wish to make progress, dismiss all reasoning
of this sort: 'If I neglect my affairs, I shall have
If I do not punish my slaveboy, he
nothing to live on.'
will turn out bad.' For it is better to die of hunger,
but in a state of freedom from grief and fear, than to
live in plenty, but troubled in mind. And it is better
for your slavebov to be bad than for you to be unhappy"
(Johnson, 1974, p. 89).

7.

The idea that it is easier to avoid than to face certain
life difficulties and self-responsibilities.
"And if you meet anything that is laborious, or sweet,
or held in high repute, or in no repute, remember that
now is the contest, and here before you are the Olympic
games, and that it is impossible to delay any longer, and
that it depends on a single day and a single action,
whether progress is lost or saved" (Johnson, 1974, p. 100).

S.

The idea that one should be dependent on others and
needs someone stronger than oneself on whom to rely.
"In the case of everything that befalls you, remember
to turn to yourself and see what faculty you have to deal
with it" (Johnson, 1974, p. 88).

9.

The idea that one's past history is an all-important
determiner of one's present behavior and that because
something once strongly affected one's life, it should
indefinitely have a similar effect.
"You are no longer a lad, but already a full-grown
man" (Johnson, 1974, D. 100).

10.

The ideas that one should become quite upset over other
people's problems and disturbances.
"Somebody is hasty about bathing; do not say that he
bathes badly, but that he is hasty about bathing. Somebody drinks a good deal of wine; do not say that he drinks
badly, but that he drinks a good deal. For until you
have decided what judgment prompts him, how do you know
that what he is doing is bad" (Johnson, 1974, p. 99).

11.

The idea that there is invariably a right, precise, and
perfect solution to human problems and that it is catastrophic if this perfect solution is not found.
"Remember that you are an actor in a play, the
character of which is determined by the playwright"
(Johnson, 1974, p. 90).
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